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Abstract* 
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), to give plaintiffs an opportunity to civilly 
litigate their federal constitutional and statutory claims against state and local officials.1 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s silence with respect to the availability of any 
immunities as indicating that Congress enacted § 1983 against the backdrop of common law 
absolute and qualified immunities for government officials. Qualified immunity protects 
government officials from liability for conduct that does not violate clearly established federal 
law. In its recent decisions in Reichle v. Howards2 and Carroll v. Carman,3 the Supreme Court 
has expressly reserved the question of whether precedent from lower federal courts, including the 
courts of appeals, can clearly establish federal constitutional or statutory rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* I would like to thank Professor Philip Pucillo for his help identifying the implications of the 
sometimes-messy policy considerations in qualified immunity. Any oversights are my own. 
1 Claims against federal officials can be brought under the federally created analog, the Bivens 
action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
2 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012). 
3 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014) (per curiam). 
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This article argues that the only relevant arbiter of federal law for clearly establishing 
federal rights is the Supreme Court of the United States. To say otherwise puts an onerous 
requirement on state and local officials by requiring them to be familiar with the law of their 
state and other states; the law of their circuit and other circuits; in addition to the law of the 
Supreme Court. No reasonable official could be expected to keep current on the developments of 
fifty states, thirteen circuits, and nine territories and associated states on top of the developments 
of the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court cannot be the only arbiter of clearly established 
federal law, however, then only the official’s home circuit should supplement the inquiry. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 
In 1871, the Forty-Second Congress enacted Section 1 of the Klu Klux Klan Act, “[a]n 
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and for other Purposes.”4 Congress passed Section 1 of the Act pursuant to the authority 
vested in it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 In part, the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”6 Although subsequently amended and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012),7 the statute’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Enforcement Act of 1871 (Klu Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
5 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In full, § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
7 SHELDON H NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 3 (LexisNexis 3d ed. 2009). 
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language has not materially changed.8 It stands today much as it did when it was passed almost 
150 years ago: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia.9 
Although the language of § 1983 has not materially changed, it has been extensively 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. What is a “person”?10 How do you define “under color of” 
state law?11 What is a “custom”?12 The list of textual interpretations goes on. One of the most 
important interpretations of § 1983, however, has nothing to do with its text: whether a state 
official can avoid liability by invoking absolute or qualified immunity.13  
The answer has been a resounding yes. In 1951, the Supreme Court recognized absolute 
immunity for legislators.14 Within twenty-five years, it had also recognized absolute immunity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (incorporating language 
concerning the District of Columbia); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-317, 110 Stat. 3853 (protecting judicial officers from prospective injunctive relief “unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”). 
9 § 1983. 
10 See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 701–02 (holding municipalities are persons under § 1983). 
11 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (holding in part that state action 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is action under color of state law under § 1983). 
12 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970) (interpreting custom to 
be a practice so permanent as to carry the force of law). 
13 The plain language of § 1983 “admits of no immunities.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
417 (1976). 
14 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
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for judges15 and prosecutors,16 and qualified immunity for police officers.17 Although some 
executive officials, like prosecutors, enjoy absolute immunity, the Court has recognized that 
“qualified immunity represents the norm” for the remainder, 18  with the exception of 
municipalities—they enjoy no immunity because no such protection existed at common law.19 
While absolute immunity protects judges, legislators, prosecutors, and other recognized 
high-level officials in the exercise of their respective functions,20 qualified immunity for the 
remainder of government officials was originally based on “good faith” adherence to the law.21 
In late 2014, the Supreme Court summarized the essentials of qualified immunity in Carroll v. 
Carman.22 It stated, “[a] government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity 
unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the 
time of the challenged conduct.”23 
This article addresses whether lower courts can clearly establish statutory or 
constitutional rights. In Carroll, the Court “[a]ssum[ed] for the sake of argument that a 
controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law.”24 In doing so, it 
relied on Reichle v. Howards, decided in 2012, in which it “[a]ssum[ed] arguendo” the same.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
16 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. 
17 Pierson, 368 U.S. at 555. 
18 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. 
19 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). 
20 See id. 
21 Id. at 815. 
22 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (citing Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012)). 
25 Id. 
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This article seeks to answer this question: clearly established rights under § 198326 can only be 
so established by the Supreme Court of the United States, or, perhaps, the official’s home circuit. 
This article begins in Section II with a history of qualified immunity. Section III 
discusses what constitutes clearly established federal law. Section IV contemplates the deference 
that is given to states, the limitations on redress of constitutional rights, and the role of the courts. 
Section V addresses the arguments against having the Court serve as the only, supreme arbiter of 
constitutional rights. Finally, Section VI explains why the Supreme Court of the United States is 
the only judicial body that can “clearly establish” federal law, with the possible exception of the 
official’s home circuit. 
II. HISTORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Governmental immunity is deeply rooted in the common law. Legislative immunity dates 
back to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.27 Judicial immunity was recognized as early as 
1608 in England.28 And prosecutorial immunity, although not similarly found in the storied past 
of England, traces back to at least 1896 in Indiana.29 Because of the extensive history and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This article does not specifically address qualified immunity with respect to Bivens actions, 
see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), and instead consistently 
refers to § 1983 claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Governmental immunity, however, is treated 
the same under both, as it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity 
law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under 
the Constitution against federal officials.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). 
Accordingly, this article does rely on some cases arising out of a Bivens cause of action. 
27 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). It arose out of the struggles of Parliament as 
it gained increasing independence from the Crown. Id. The Court recognized legislative 
immunity in § 1983 claims in Tenney, id. at 379. 
28 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). The Court recognized judicial immunity 
in § 1983 actions in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds by 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
29 Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (Ind. 1896). The Court recognized prosecutorial 
immunity in § 1983 actions in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 
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importance of governmental immunity, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 was enacted against 
their backdrop.30 Qualified immunity, however, carries with it a different history.  
A. Qualified Immunity Established as a Matter of “Good Faith” 
The Court first recognized the existence of qualified immunity in § 1983 actions in 
Pierson v. Ray.31 The case involved “a group of 15 white and Negro Episcopal clergymen who 
attempted to use segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi.”32 
They were arrested by police officers under the guise of a breach-of-peace statute, arguably in 
violation of their equal protection rights.33 
Although ultimately determining that police officers could present an immunity 
defense,34 the Court first noted that there had never been an absolute immunity for officers.35 But 
the Court recognized qualified, or “good faith,” immunity because it was widely held that 
officers are not liable for false arrest even when a suspect is later found innocent—so long as the 
officers executed the arrest in good faith and with probable cause.36 Similar to absolute 
immunities, the Court held that qualified immunity was part of the “backdrop” against which § 
1983 was enacted.37 As a matter of principle, an official “is not charged with predicting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 (stating “§ 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles 
of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them”). 
31 386 U.S. at 557.  
32 Id. at 549. 
33 Id. The statute was later held unconstitutional, but it was unchallenged at the time of the 
arrests. Id. at 550. 
34 Id. at 557. 
35 Id. at 555. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 556–57 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds 
by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
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future course of constitutional law,” and cannot be liable for enforcing a statute later found 
unconstitutional.38 
Within a decade, the Court recognized in Scheuer v. Rhodes that qualified immunity 
applies across the executive branch in varying degree, depending on the “scope of discretion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of 
the action.”39 More importantly, however, was that the Court in Wood v. Strickland clarified 
what was perhaps not so clear in Pierson: there is a two-part test for qualified immunity, one 
subjective, and one objective.40  
Subjectively, “[t]he official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is 
doing right.”41 Objectively, however, ignorance of “settled, indisputable” law is not an excuse.42 
Accordingly, qualified immunity fails if the official “knew or reasonably should have known” 
that he was violating a constitutional right, or if he maliciously or intentionally deprived an 
individual of that right.43 Assuming no malice, the official “must be held to a standard of conduct 
based . . . on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.”44 
B. Good Faith Rejected for Objective Reasonableness 
The decision in Wood regarding subjective “good faith” did not long sit well with the 
Court. Just seven years later, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court rejected the two-pronged, 
subjective-objective approach in favor of a purely objective test: whether a “reasonable person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. at 557; see also id. at 555 (“A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose 
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, 
and being mulcted in damages if he does.”). 
39 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). 
40 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 322. The Wood Court limited this test to “specific context of school discipline.” Id. Yet, 
the Court adopted it outside that context in later cases. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
815 n.25 (1982). 
44 Wood, 420 U.S. at 322. 
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would have known” that the conduct violated a “clearly established statutory or constitutional 
right.”45 The Court observed that qualified immunity avoids “distraction of officials from their 
governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public 
service.”46 Accordingly, insubstantial claims against public officials should not proceed to trial.47 
Because decision makers often rely on their own “experiences, values, and emotions,” a 
subjective prong would virtually always allow discovery to determine whether their motives 
were permissible.48 In addition, the range of potentially relevant or permissible inquiry into these 
motives could cause substantial disruption regarding performance of the official’s duties.49 Thus, 
the goal of preventing frivolous litigation would fall victim to artful pleading by plaintiffs.50 
C. Objective Reasonableness Defined 
The Court refined the objective qualified-immunity inquiry in Anderson v. Creighton 
when it held that “clearly established rights” are not described at a high level of generality.51 In 
Anderson, a police officer had ostensibly violated the plaintiffs’ rights by entering their home 
with neither a warrant nor exigent circumstances.52  The Eighth Circuit rejected qualified 
immunity for the officer because, if the plaintiffs’ allegations were proved, the officer violated 
the clearly established right against a warrantless search without exigent circumstances.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 457 U.S. at 818. Interestingly, however, the Court also created an escape hatch: if the official 
can show, as a result of “extraordinary circumstances,” that he or she neither knew nor should 
have known of clearly established law, the official can assert qualified immunity. Id. at 819. 
46 Id. at 816. 
47 Id. at 815–16. 
48 Id. at 816. 
49 See id. at 817. 
50 Id. at 816–17. 
51 483 U.S. 635, 638–40 (1987). 
52 Id. at 637. 
53 Id. at 638. 
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The Supreme Court reversed.54 It held that the qualified-immunity analysis should turn 
on whether a “reasonable officer could have believed the search to be lawful”—not whether a 
general right was clearly established.55 Noting that “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’”56 the Court held that the promise 
of immunity would be stripped away if rights were defined at high levels of generality.57 Officers 
must be allowed to make mistakes regarding clearly established general rights, so long as they 
are reasonable.58 By contrast, officers are not given such latitude when the rights are established 
in a more “particularized” way, one where the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”59 “[T]he doctrine 
of qualified immunity reflects a balance that has been struck ‘across the board.’”60 
The Court announced the impact of an undeveloped state of the law on qualified 
immunity in Wilson v. Layne.61 In Wilson, United States Marshals brought along a photographer 
and a reporter inside a home when they executed an arrest warrant as part of Operation 
Gunsmoke, a program geared towards apprehending dangerous felons.62 The Court unanimously 
held that the “media ride along” violated the Fourth Amendment because the presence of the 
media was neither necessary to carry out, nor specified in, the warrant.63 Still, the Court noted, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Id. at 646. 
55 Id. at 638, 640. 
56 Id. at 639 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
57 Id. at 640.  
58 Id. at 641 (stating “it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably 
but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases 
those officials . . . should not be held personally liable”). 
59 Id. at 640. 
60 Id. at 642 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
61 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). 
62 Id. at 605–07. 
63 Id. at 609–14.  
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“the constitutional question presented by this case is by no means open and shut.”64 This was 
partly because accurate reporting was a laudable goal not obviously antithetical to the values of 
the Fourth Amendment, and partly because there was a dearth of case law on point.65  
Because the state of the law “was at best undeveloped,” the Court was satisfied that the 
Marshals could have reasonably relied on the media ride-along policy developed in conjunction 
with Operation Gunsmoke.66 Officials are not required to predict the course of the law, and the 
Court noted that a circuit split had arisen on the issue since the incident had occurred.67 As a 
matter of pragmatism and policy, “[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is 
unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”68 
D. “Materially Similar” Cases Are Not Required to Clearly Establish Law 
In Hope v. Pelzer, the Court established that a prior case with either “materially similar” 
or “fundamentally similar” facts is not required to find that a right is clearly established.69 The 
Court noted that the “clearly established” inquiry in § 1983 claims is no different from the “fair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id. at 615.  
65 Id. at 615–17. 
66 Id. at 617. 
67 Id. at 617–18. 
68 Id. at 618. Justice Stevens dissented from the clearly-established-law part of the opinion 
because the Court did not “announce[] a new rule of constitutional law,” but rather “refused to 
recognize an entirely unprecedented request for an exception to a well-established principle.” Id. 
at 619 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens’s view, a unanimous Court holding the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment means the question was open and shut. Id. at 620. The dearth of 
case law is not dispositive because “‘[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.’” Id. at 621 (quoting 
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). Although defeated in this case, Justice 
Stevens successfully addressed this issue three years later as the author of the Court’s opinion in 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733 (2002). 
69 536 U.S. 730, 733, 741 (2002). Some commentators question the relevance of Hope because it 
has not been cited in later cases—even at times where the lower courts specifically relied on it—
where the Court has held that the law was not clearly established. Karen Blum, Erwin 
Chemerisnky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for 
Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 654–56 (2013). But to say that Hope was overruled goes too 
far, and thus it is still relevant, although how relevant it is can be debated. Id.at 656. 
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notice” standard in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012), actions,70 the criminal counterpart to § 1983.71 The 
egregious allegations in Hope were perhaps necessary to reiterate this point after Wilson.72 
In Hope, the inmate plaintiff was twice handcuffed to a hitching post pursuant to 
Alabama law.73 In the first instance, the plaintiff was handcuffed to a post after a scuffle with 
another inmate.74 He was only handcuffed for a couple of hours before the guards determined 
that the other inmate started the fight.75 During this time, the plaintiff was “offered drinking 
water and a bathroom break every 15 minutes.”76 In the second instance, the plaintiff “was 
punished more severely,” likely because he got into a “wrestling match with a guard” after 
getting off too slowly from the prison bus carrying him to a work site.77 He was handcuffed to 
the post for seven hours after being forced to remove his shirt.78 He was shirtless for the entire 
ordeal, causing the sun to burn his skin.79 “[H]e was given water only once or twice and was 
given no bathroom breaks.”80 In addition, the guard also allegedly taunted him about his thirst.81 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the “practice of cuffing an inmate to a hitching post . . . for 
a period of time that surpasses that necessary to quell a threat or restore order is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”82 Yet, it still afforded the guards qualified immunity because there was no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Hope, 536 U.S. at 740 & n.10. 
71 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 166 & n.36 (1970). 
72 This proposition had already been firmly established in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 
270–71 (1997). As previously noted, see discussion supra note 68, Justice Stevens lost on a 
similar argument in Wilson. He got his victory as the author of the majority opinion in Hope. 
73 536 U.S. at 733–34. 
74 Id. at 734.  
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 734–35. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 735. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 736 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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case “materially similar” to the case at bar.83 The Supreme Court agreed there was an Eighth 
Amendment violation, 84  but it disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s qualified-immunity 
analysis.85 The Court suggested that the violation was so “obvious” that its own precedents gave 
the guards fair warning of the unconstitutional nature of their conduct.86 Regardless, it “readily 
conclude[d]” that circuit precedent, prison regulations, and a Department of Justice report 
advising of the “constitutional infirmity” of the practice provided ample support that the 
violation was clearly established.87 It also dismissed district court precedent raised by the guards 
because they were (1) distinguishable, and (2) “no match for the circuit precedents.”88 The Court 
therefore held the law was clearly established, despite there being no “materially similar” case.89 
E. Can Circuit Court Precedent Clearly Establish Constitutional Law? The Twice-
Dodged Question  
The current state of affairs for qualified immunity is demonstrated by two of the Court’s 
most recent cases on the matter, both of which dodged the question of whether lower-court 
precedent could clearly establish federal rights.  
The first case, Reichle v. Howards, concerned a plaintiff who alleged that Secret Service 
agents arrested him in the absence of probable cause and in retaliation for protected First 
Amendment speech.90 According to Tenth Circuit precedent, a retaliatory arrest violated the First 
Amendment.91 The Tenth Circuit rejected the agents’ argument that having probable cause for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 738. 
85 Id. at 741–42. 
86 Id. at 741. 
87 Id. at 741–42. 
88 Id. at 747. 
89 Id. at 748. 
90 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2092 (2012).  
91 Id.  
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the arrest precluded a finding of retaliatory arrest.92 The agents had relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hartman v. Moore, 93  which had established the same for retaliatory 
prosecutions. The Tenth Circuit held, however, that Hartman was not applicable to retaliatory 
arrests.94  
The Supreme Court first noted that its own precedent did not clearly establish whether a 
retaliatory arrest violated the First Amendment when it was supported by probable cause, and so 
it turned to Tenth Circuit precedent.95 The Court cautioned, however, that it was “[a]ssuming 
arguendo” that Tenth Circuit precedent “could be a dispositive source of clearly established 
law.”96 Regardless, the Court found that Tenth Circuit precedent did not clearly establish that an 
arrest supported by probable cause violated the plaintiff’s free speech rights.97 The lack of clarity 
stemmed from the impact of Hartman on the Tenth Circuit’s retaliatory prosecution precedent, 
which “was far from clear” because the legal backdrop treated retaliatory arrests and 
prosecutions similarly.98 The Court did not extend Hartman to retaliatory arrests, but simply 
noted that it could “arguably” do so, and so the plaintiff’s alleged right was not clearly 
established.99 
The second recent case, Carroll v. Carman, arose from a search of the Carmans’ home by 
police officers who had been informed that a felon had fled there.100 The dispute centered on 
whether the officers could knock on the Carmans’s backdoor when the officers thought it was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Id. 
93 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 
94 Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2092. 
95 Id. at 2093–94. 
96 Id. at 2094. 
97 Id. at 2096–97. 
98 Id. at 2095. 
99 Id.  
100 135 S. Ct. 348, 348–49 (2014) (per curiam). 
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“customary entryway.”101 The jury found for the officers, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding 
that a “knock and talk” must begin “at the front door, where [officers] have an implied invitation 
to go.”102 The Third Circuit also denied qualified immunity because the officers had violated the 
Carmans’ clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment.103 
In reversing the Third Circuit’s qualified-immunity analysis, the Supreme Court noted 
that the Third Circuit had relied only upon its own case to resolve the qualified-immunity 
issue.104 The Court seems to have signaled its concern over whether circuit precedent could 
clearly establish rights because, as in Reichle, it again assumed “for the sake of argument” that 
circuit precedent could clearly establish rights before reversing the Third Circuit.105 
Relying on its own case law, the Third Circuit reasoned that because “entry into the 
curtilage after not receiving an answer at the front door might be reasonable,” a knock and talk 
must begin at the front door.106 The Court rejected this interpretation as a non sequitur because 
Third Circuit precedent “simply did not answer the question whether a ‘knock and talk’ must 
begin at the front door when visitors may also go to the back door.”107 And, where the jury found 
the officers arguably went where the public could, Third Circuit precedent may actually have 
supported the officers’ actions.108 
Interestingly, the Court also surveyed the decisions of the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits, and found they ran counter to the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the Fourth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Id. at 349. 
102 Id. at 349–50. 
103 Id. at 350. 
104 Id. (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
105 Id. (citing Reichle v. Howards, 135 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012)). 
106 Id. at 351. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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Amendment for knock and talks.109 The Court refused to call into question those decisions or 
provide a definitive answer regarding the legality of the officers’ conduct in this case.110 Instead, 
it simply held that the constitutional question was not “‘beyond debate,’” and the Third Circuit 
erred in not affording the officers qualified immunity.111 
III. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW 
This section will consider what, according to the Supreme Court, qualifies as “clearly 
established federal law.” As explained in Sections I and II, § 1983 “admits of no immunities.”112 
So, the relevant analysis is the common law. Unfortunately, the common law standard for 
whether law is clearly established is merely a jumble of word associations. 
From its inception into the § 1983 context, qualified immunity has been based on the 
principle that an official “is not charged with predicting the future course of constitutional 
law.”113 And while qualified immunity originally included a subjective element, it has never 
been acceptable for an official to ignore “settled, indisputable” law.114 So, although an official 
need not predict the evolution of law, he is “held to a standard of conduct based . . . on 
knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.”115 This duty is 
essentially whether a “reasonable person would have known” that the alleged conduct violated a 
“clearly established statutory or constitutional right.”116 But despite this rule, the Court has also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Id. at 351–52. 
110 Id. at 352. 
111 Id. (quoting Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013)). 
112 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). 
113 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
114 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). 
115 Id. at 322. 
116 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
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recognized that officials may avoid liability for violating even a clearly established right if they 
can show that “extraordinary circumstances” prevented them from knowing the law.117 
Whether a right is clearly established depends on the level of generality by which the 
right is defined. A “clearly established” right is not described at a macro level.118 But a case 
directly on point is not necessary.119 Nor is a case with “materially similar” or “fundamentally 
similar” facts.120 What must be shown is a right that is described in a “particularized” way so that 
a reasonable official would know the right exists.121 And it seems that a reasonable official 
encompasses “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”122  
In any event, if the law is “at best undeveloped,” no official could reasonably be held to 
have violated clearly established law,123 unless such a violation was somehow obvious.124 Even 
developed law, however, may not be enough if judges disagree on its contours.125 Where the 
constitutional question is not “beyond debate,” the law is not clearly established.126  
But what law matters? In the past three years, the Court has twice avoided the question of 
whether circuit precedent can clearly establish constitutional rights.127 Yet, in both cases, the 
Court heavily scrutinized circuit precedent to determine whether a right was clearly established 
when its own precedents failed to do so.128 This avoidance, however, is not new. In 2002, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Id. at 819. 
118 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 640 (1987). 
119 Id. at 640. 
120 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733, 741 (2002). 
121 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
122 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
123 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617–18 (1999). 
124 Hope, 536 U.S. at 738. 
125 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618 (noting there was a circuit split). 
126 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013). 
127 Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2094 (2012). 
128 Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350–52; Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093–94. 
18 Kevin Stokes 
Court reviewed lower-court precedent in Hope v. Pelzer even though it signaled that it felt its 
own precedents clearly established the applicable law.129 Yet, it did not declare whether circuit 
precedent could clearly establish a right.  
It appears the Court is wary about affording lower-court precedent the status of “clearly 
established law.” But to be clear, the Court was equally as wary of declaring that only its own 
precedent can clearly establish law in United States v. Lanier.130 In the Court’s words, “contrary 
to the Court of Appeals, we think it unsound to read [Screws v. United States131] as reasoning 
that only this Court’s decisions could provide the required warning.”132  
To support its statement, the Lanier Court cited three of its prior § 1983 decisions133 in 
which it considered lower-court precedent to determine whether a right was clearly 
established.134 As explained below, however, these cases do not fully support the statement that 
lower-court precedents can independently clearly establish federal law. They cannot, then, be 
used to establish the authority for looking to lower courts for clearly established precedent. 
In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the first case cited by the Lanier Court, the Court was determining 
whether “a warrantless wiretap aimed at gathering intelligence regarding a domestic threat to 
national security” was a violation of clearly established law in 1970.135 The Court first showed 
that there was significant ambiguity in the contours of its own precedent at the time of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 536 U.S. at 741–46. 
130 520 U.S. 259, 268 (1997). 
131 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
132 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 268. The decision in Lanier dealt with 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012), the 
criminal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
166 & n.36 (1970). But the Lanier Court held that the clearly established inquiry under § 1983 is 
the same inquiry as the fair warning inquiry under § 242. 520 U.S. at 270–71. 
133 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 533 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191–92 
(1984); id. at 203–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).  
134 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269. 
135 472 U.S. at 530. The Court had held that it was a violation, but not until 1972. See id. 
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conduct,136 and then used lower-court precedent to bolster its analysis that the right was not 
clearly established. 137  The Court accordingly did not rely on lower-court precedent to 
affirmatively hold that a right was clearly established. 
The second case cited by the Lanier Court, Davis v. Scherer, also fails to support the 
proposition that lower-court precedent suffices to clearly establish federal law.138 The Court 
simply found that no law was clearly established by the Fifth Circuit.139 It therefore never 
addressed the question of whether Fifth Circuit precedent could clearly establish law in the first 
place. Even Justice Brennan’s dissent—upon which the Lanier Court relies—failed to 
conclusively state that lower-court precedent can be used to clearly establish federal rights. 
Justice Brennan quoted language from the majority opinion regarding whether the law was “well 
established in the Fifth Circuit at the time of the conduct in question.”140 But this language 
originated from the appellee’s brief.141 Justice Brennan’s disagreement with the majority does 
not mean the Court will consider circuit precedent to resolve a qualified-immunity analysis 
because the Court only concluded that the law was not clearly established.142 
Finally, the Lanier Court relied on Elder v. Holloway to show that it had considered 
circuit precedent in the past.143 Of the three, Elder most directly supports the Court’s proposition 
that lower-court precedent can clearly establish federal law. Quoting with modification from 
Davis, the Court stated that a reviewing court should “use its ‘full knowledge of its own [and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Id. at 531–32. 
137 Id. at 533. 
138 468 U.S. at 191–92. 
139 Id. at 191–93, 197. 
140 Id. at 204–05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141 See id. at 192 (majority opinion). 
142 Id. at 191–93, 197. 
143 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
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other relevant] precedents.’”144 It accordingly remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for 
consideration of all relevant precedent, including one of its own decisions.145 
Yet, the Elder Court quoted Davis after it had just clarified for the Ninth Circuit that 
Davis did not concern “the authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity, 
but [instead an] entirely discrete question.”146 So, relying on Davis for the proposition that a 
lower court could use its own precedent to clearly establish rights is questionable, particularly 
given the discussion of Davis above. Indeed, it is perhaps as likely that the Court did not give 
this statement much thought147 as that the Court intended to conclude that lower courts could rely 
on their own precedents.148 But, given the qualifying statements in Reichle and Carroll,149 it 
seems that the rational reading of these cases is that the Court has danced around the issue, but 
has never properly resolved it one way or the other.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 468 U.S. at 192 n.9). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 515. The full context of this statement is helpful: 
In thinking its rule compelled by this Court's instruction, the Ninth Circuit 
misconstrued Davis v. Scherer. The Court held in Davis that an official's clear 
violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a § 1983 plaintiff to 
overcome the official's qualified immunity. Only in this context is the Court's 
statement comprehensible: “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of 
constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified 
immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established . . . .” Davis, 
in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in determining 
qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity 
defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one 
under state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which 
the claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. 
Id. (alteration and emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
147 The case did not revolve around this inquiry. The question was whether the Ninth Circuit 
could consider legal precedents not addressed by or briefed to the district court. Id. at 511–12. 
148 The case was decided in only four paragraphs of analysis in which it also considered whether 
the Ninth Circuit could consider precedent not considered by the district court. See id. at 514–16.  
149 Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2094 (2012). 
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The Court has not yet answered whether lower-court—or state-court—precedent can 
clearly establish federal law. Arguably, it has operated under that assumption, but it has not 
definitively stated so.150 And, given the recent reluctance of the Court to turn this assumption 
into a legal holding,151 it is fair to say the Court is no longer operating under that assumption, if it 
ever was. With this muddled state of affairs, it is appropriate to turn to the deference owed in the 
court system, the limitations of certain judicial bodies, and the roles of the courts to determine 
whether lower-court precedent should be surveyed in a qualified-immunity analysis.  
IV. DEFERENCE, LIMITATIONS, AND ROLES  
To determine which court—or courts—is relevant to the clearly-established-law inquiry, 
the limitations and roles of the courts must be analyzed, including the deference due to judicial 
bodies and government officials. But, before delving into the nuts and bolts of the judicial 
system to understand how plaintiffs might gain from it, one principle cannot be emphasized 
enough: not every constitutional violation is afforded a remedy.152 This should be clear from the 
fact that there is any sort of immunity at all, but it bears repeating. Qualified immunity is not 
about avoiding trial only when the claims are meritless. It is about “the need to shield officials 
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”153  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 When the Court rejected the subjective viewpoint for qualified immunity analyses in Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, it refused to determine “the circumstances under which ‘the state of the law’ 
should be ‘evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of 
the local District Court.’” 457 U.S. 800, 818 n.32 (1982) (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 
U.S. 555, 565 (1978)). Arguably, this could be read as reserving the question of when to look to 
which court instead of reserving the question of whether to look to lower courts at all—the focus 
of this article. 
151 Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350; Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094. 
152 See, e.g., Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (“Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a 
discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed 
that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury 
warranting relief under § 1983.”). 
153 Pierson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
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A. Deference to Lower Courts and Officials 
Deference plays an important role in qualified immunity. There is no question that courts 
determine whether law is clearly established.154 It is also beyond debate that the question of 
whether constitutional and federal law is clearly established is a question of law subject to 
de novo review on appeal.155 And “[c]ourts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional 
responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties.”156 In doing so, the Supreme Court 
and the circuit courts of appeals owe no deference to the interpretations of constitutional law by 
district courts157 and state courts.158 
But deference also comes into play for qualified-immunity purposes in a different, 
perhaps more important, way than the standard of appellate review for questions of law. In the 
Fourth Amendment context, the standard of reasonableness reflects the deference given to 
officials.159 Qualified immunity is much the same.160 Despite the supremacy of federal law,161 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Under Article III of the Constitution, “[t]he judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. And in 1803, Justice Marshall famously reserved 
to the judiciary the power to “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
155 Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
156 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827) (“This Court is 
the final arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded constitutional 
constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we consider that question.”). 
157 See, e.g., Leavitt v. Lane, 518 U.S. 137, 146 & n.* (Steven, J., dissenting). 
158 See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 & n.16 (2007). Arguably, the courts must 
give deference to state decisions of constitutional law in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1) (2012). But in the habeas context, the courts are merely determining whether the state 
court’s decisions are in clear violation of federal law. This is a different inquiry than whether the 
state court answered the federal constitutional question correctly. 
159 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250–51. 
160 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating the objective reasonableness standard 
“should avoid excessive disruption of government”). 
161 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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federal courts are typically uneasy about interjecting themselves into state-law matters,162 other 
branches of government,163 and the actions of agencies.164  
The job of police officers is to enforce the law, and their job would be hindered—to the 
detriment of society—if they were expected to interpret the law.165 As such, they are “not 
charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law.”166 Nor are they required to be 
legal scholars.167 Because of this, the Supreme Court gives deference to the officers so long as 
their actions are objectively reasonable and do not violate clearly established law.168 
Reviewing courts owe no deference to a lower court’s interpretation of the law. The 
ultimate resolution of what constitutes clearly established law, however, must consider the 
deference due to the state and local officials performing their jobs to the best of their abilities. 
School principals are not constitutional scholars. Detectives are not soothsayers. And 
municipalities are not omniscient. The clearly-established-law standard must reflect this reality.  
B. Limitations of the Courts 
The structure of the court system places certain limitations on each judicial body. When 
interpreting federal law, how much authority should each court have in its interpretation? Should 
federal courts be considered superior to state courts because they encounter it more often and are 
considered the vanguard of interpreting federal rights?169 Should appellate courts be considered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See, e.g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932).  
163 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (executive action is entitled to 
deference). 
164 See, e.g., Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
165 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979). 
166 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
167 Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (holding that an officer’s reasonable 
mistake of law can justify an investigatory stop). 
168 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19. 
169 Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal courts defer to state 
high courts’ interpretations of their state's own law.”). 
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superior to trial courts because they consider legal questions more often? These questions are 
considered in this section. 
The difference between state judges and federal judges is important. While federal judges 
are appointed for life,170 state judges might only be appointed for a specified number of years, or 
they may have to seek election (and then reelection) to the position.171 This means that federal 
judges, unlike many state judges, are insulated from the negative effects that an unpopular 
decision might have on their continued judicial tenure. Otherwise, state and federal courts 
operate similarly enough, although generally state courts focus on state-law questions and federal 
courts focus on federal-law questions.172 But it is up to the federal, not the state, judiciary to 
determine what federal law “is.”173 Accordingly, there is a limit on how much a state court can 
influence federal law. Their decisions are generally confined to their respective state 
jurisdictions. 
Jurisdiction is an important consideration. In the federal system, there are ninety-four 
district courts, thirteen circuit courts of appeal, and one Supreme Court of the United States.174 
The district courts have jurisdiction within their district, the circuit courts within their circuit, and 
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire United States. In the state and territory system, 
there are fifty states, and nine territories and associated states, each with varying levels, tiers, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their 
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”). 
171 The Difference Between Federal and State Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction/DifferencebetweenFederalAndStateC
ourts.aspx (last visited April 1, 2015). 
172 Id. 
173 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
174 Introduction to The Federal Court System, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-
101/federal-courts (last visited April 1, 2015).  
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numbers of courts.175 In total, there are 167 jurisdictions in the federal-state court system. The 
limits of each court are obvious: they cannot ordinarily assert their jurisdiction outside of their 
geographic area. Only the Supreme Court has authority to interpret federal law for the nation. 
Caseload and administrative structure is also important. In 2014, the district courts 
disposed of 345,000 cases, leaving a balance of 439,000 cases pending.176 With 677 authorized 
judgeships, each district judge decided an average of 556 cases.177 In many of these cases, there 
is only one judge deciding the case, and he or she is pressed for time. By comparison, the twelve 
regional circuit courts confronted 55,000 filings,178 or about 14.6% of the district court caseload 
in 2014.179 Unlike district courts, circuit courts generally decide cases in panels of three 
judges.180 The average appellate panel in 2014 disposed of 992 cases.181 While judges may rotate 
authorship of opinions, each judge must at least be familiar enough with each case to either 
subscribe to an opinion or write a dissenting opinion. 
The Supreme Court of the United States carries a much different caseload. The docket of 
the 2013 October Term consisted of 8,850 cases.182 Of these, the Court disposed of 7,547, 
leaving a balance of 1,033 cases.183 These numbers are misleading, however, as the Court grants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 State Government, USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/State-and-Territories.shtml (last 
visited April 1, 2015). 
176 U.S. District Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
2014/us-district-courts.aspx (last visited April 1, 2015). 
177 Id. 
178 U.S. Courts of Appeals, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 
2014/us-courts-of-appeals.aspx (last visited April 1, 2015). 
179 55,000 / 376,000 = 14.63% 
180 Introduction to The Federal Court System, supra note 174. 
181 U.S. Courts of Appeals, supra note 178. 
182 Supreme Court of the United States—Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and Remaining on 
Docket, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/ 
appendices/A01Sep14.pdf (last visited April 1, 2015). 
183 Id. 
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a writ of certiorari to hear and decide a case only about 1% of the time.184 So, in 2013, the Court 
heard and decided 79 cases, and decided 72 cases without oral argument.185  
This means the Supreme Court decided only 151 cases in a year, as compared to 992 
cases for the average circuit court panel. Given this marked difference, it seems that the Supreme 
Court is in the best position to consider cases in depth and to declare federal law for the entire 
United States. In addition, the Supreme Court owes no deference to either district or circuit 
courts in considering questions of law.186 Given that a “principal purpose” of exercising the 
Court’s jurisdiction is to resolve circuit splits,187 the additional time per case is crucial to the 
establishment of settled law. This settled law can readily form the basis for qualified-immunity 
inquiries for § 1983 claims. 
C. Roles of the Courts 
Related to the limitations of the courts are their roles. Trial courts typically preside over 
trials and make findings of fact.188 They accordingly have an “institutional advantage” over 
appellate courts with regard to many factual and discretionary matters.189 This is in part because 
they see cases first hand, many of which are never appealed,190 and in part because they have the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
faq.aspx (last visited April 1, 2015); Kedar S. Bhatia, Likelihood of a Petition Being Granted, 
DAILYWRIT.COM (Jan. 10, 2013), http://dailywrit.com/2013/01/likelihood-of-a-petition-being-
granted/.  
185 Supreme Court of the United States—Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and Remaining on 
Docket, supra note 182. 
186 Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
187 Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347 (1991). 
188 See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 
189 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). 
190 See discussion supra Part IV.B (circuit courts only handle about 14.6% of the cases district 
courts do, and do not have a disproportionate amount of pending cases; a necessary corollary is 
that many district court cases are never appealed). 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS THE ONLY RELEVANT ARBITER OF FEDERAL LAW 27 
judicial competence and experience to make rulings that are not easily reviewed on appeal 
through the examination of a “cold and distant record.”191  
The role of appellate courts, on the other hand, is to review and correct legal error.192 
Regarding questions of law, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court.193 
Accordingly, the courts of appeals are likely to develop an institutional advantage in deciding 
legal matters because of their significant experience issuing legal opinions. 
The Supreme Court’s roles differ even more.194 On writs of certiorari, the Justices 
generally resolve circuit (or state) splits on federal questions,195 or definitely state the law even if 
there is no circuit (or state) split on a federal question.196 Otherwise, the Court will hear original 
claims filed based on its Article III jurisdiction,197 special appeals from district courts,198 
arguments on certified questions,199 and extraordinary writs.200 The various roles ensure that the 
Court considers only pressing cases of national importance. 
V. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION 
It is not the prevailing view that the Supreme Court is the only relevant arbiter of federal 
law. Many commentators have argued that limitation of § 1983 claims is not in the best interests 
of plaintiffs, and it is hard to argue against that notion. This section considers their arguments, 
which are refuted in the following section. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
192 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969). 
193 Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). 
194 See SUP. CT. R. 10–11, 17–20. 
195 SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(b). 
196 SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
197 SUP. CT. R. 17. 
198 SUP. CT. R. 18. 
199 SUP. CT. R. 19. 
200 SUP. CT. R. 20. 
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In a thorough critique against converging constitutional remedies, Thomas K.S. Fu argues 
that “none of the rationales for limiting ‘clearly established’ law to Supreme Court precedent in 
the post-conviction habeas context apply in the qualified immunity context.”201 Although not 
strictly the focus of his note, the interplay between habeas and § 1983 clearly-established-law is 
a major illustration of his argument against converging constitutional doctrines.202 Accordingly, 
it is considered even though this article does not rely on the habeas standard.203  
In his analysis of who can clearly establish rights, Fu observes that courts are statutorily 
required for habeas petitions to consider the Supreme Court’s precedent, but that no such 
statutory mandate exists in § 1983 proceedings. 204  Although Congress acquiesced to the 
qualified-immunity rule, Congress did not acquiesce to a rule requiring review of only Supreme 
Court precedent because no court had so held.205 In addition, such a restrictive rule would have 
been included in the statute.206 This is particularly salient where many federalism concerns 
inherent in habeas petitions do not exist in § 1983 actions.207 In Fu’s view, restricting review to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Thomas K.S. Fu, Note, Against Doctrinal Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 STAN. 
J.C.R. & C.L. 293, 317 (2014). 
202 Id. at 326. 
203  A comparison can be drawn between the clearly-established-law inquiry in qualified 
immunity determinations and federal habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
(2012), as both deal with the deference, limitations, and roles of the courts. The differences in 
statutory language and purpose, however, greatly limit the relevance of this comparison.  
204 Fu, supra note 201, at 317. 
205 Id.  
206 Id. at 317–18 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 437, 468 (2001)) (“As the 
Court (per Justice Scalia) has explained, Congress does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”). 
207 Id. at 318 (explaining that habeas proceedings directly question state court judgments, 
whereas § 1983 claims only implicate the conduct of state officials). But see Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff cannot seek relief under § 1983 if such relief 
would call into doubt the credibility of the state court’s criminal conviction). 
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Supreme Court precedent would actually exacerbate any federalism concerns because it reduces 
the ability of state and federal courts to respond to local, geographic concerns.208 
Fu argues that the purposes behind the clearly-established inquiries in habeas and § 1983 
claims are fundamentally different.209 The purpose of the habeas inquiry is to “protect federalism 
concerns,” whereas the purpose of the § 1983 inquiry is to “ensure that an officer has sufficient 
notice of the legality of her actions before she is subject to liability for them.”210 Restricting the 
inquiry to Supreme Court precedent does not further the purpose of § 1983 qualified 
immunity.211 While apparently conceding that officials are less likely to know all the relevant 
law in their local jurisdictions, Fu suggests that using circuit or state-court precedent incentivizes 
officials to learn the relevant law.212 He also questions whether officials would really be more 
cognizant of Supreme Court developments over those in state court.213 He therefore cautions 
against restricting the § 1983 clearly-established-law inquiry to the Supreme Court.214 
In an exhaustive analysis of qualified-immunity doctrine at the time, David Rudovsky215 
detailed the “fundamental questions concerning the appropriate balance among several 
competing interests.”216 From the plaintiff’s perspective, there is the need for “compensation for 
persons whose rights are violated,” “deterrence of unconstitutional actions by government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Fu, supra note 201, at 319 & n.133. His argument takes two major tacks, one state, and one 
federal. First, ignoring state court decisions imposes a federalism burden on state courts by 
effectively nullifying their judgments. Id. at 319. Second, the circuit courts will be unable to 
react to the needs of their respective geographic jurisdiction. Id. at 319 n.133. 
209 Id. at 319. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  
212 Id. at 320. 
213 Id. at 320–21. 
214 Id. at 325. 
215 Rudovsky argued before the Court in City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989), and 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
216 David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism 
and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 73 (1989). 
30 Kevin Stokes 
officials,” and “vindication of constitutional rights.”217 From the official’s perspective, there is 
the need to protect officials from “frivolous suits” and liability where they “acted in good faith 
and in accordance with established standards,” and to promote “vigorous and effective 
enforcement of legal and government policies.”218 The enforcement goal is related to and 
supported by the protection goal: officials can focus on their duties when they are not distracted 
by lawsuits.219 Where these competing interests meet is a difficult question.220  
Another difficulty raised by the qualified-immunity analysis was noted by Alan K. Chen: 
many constitutional standards are stated in the form of a balancing test.221 “[B]alancing tests 
identify general criteria for constitutional decisionmaking, but leave great discretion to the 
decisionmaker to apply these criteria to the individual circumstances of each case.”222 When 
constitutional rights are subject to balancing tests, the right may be established, but “it will be 
subject to infinite factual variations.”223 Accordingly, qualified immunity will often turn on the 
lack of a sufficiently related case, even though the right is clearly established.224 This is because 
rights are declared as broad principles requiring factual analysis to determine whether an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Id. at 73. 
218 Id. 
219 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). 
220 Although Rudovsky describes the competing concerns, he questions whether the Court—as 
opposed to Congress—should engage in the balancing of these interests. Rudovsky, supra note 
216, at 74. He also suggests that a civil retroactivity doctrine would be a better tool to balance 
these interests than an immunity doctrine, and would vindicate constitutional rights and protect 
government interests. Id. at 79–81; see also id. at 36 (stating that the Court has tailored the 
immunity analysis by ad hoc decisionmaking and its “own policy judgment[s]”).  
221 Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts 
in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 44 (1997). 
222 Id. at 45. 
223 Id. at 49. 
224 Id. at 49–50. 
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exception should apply,225 but they are not being treated as such by the courts.226 If no exception 
is found, the court should arguably conclude that the official violated clearly established law. 
The question of what court decisions can constitute clearly established law invokes strong 
jurisprudential and emotional arguments. 227  Caryn J. Ackerman emphatically argues that 
excluding “extracircuit precedent alters the delicate balance between the goals of § 1983 and the 
policy concerns motivating qualified immunity.”228 In doing so, she observed how the circuits 
resolve the clearly-established inquiry. Some, like the Ninth Circuit, take a relatively broad 
approach by considering decisions outside their Circuit.229 Others, like the Eleventh Circuit, 
restrict their review to their own decisions, as well as those of the Supreme Court.230 Regardless, 
each circuit reviewed had determined that its own precedent could constitute clearly established 
law.231 
Ackerman primarily focuses on the preservation of the ability of plaintiffs to vindicate 
their rights by looking outside a circuit’s own precedent.232 With more cases to consider, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Id. at 50. 
226 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 619 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
majority that the law was not clearly established because the Court did not announce a new 
principle, but rather refused to recognize “an exception to a well-established principle”). 
227 See Caryn J. Ackerman, Fairness or Fiction: Striking a Balance Between the Goals of § 1983 
and the Policy Concerns Motivating Qualified Immunity, 85 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2006) 
(“Qualified immunity inspires an assortment of metaphors as scholars and judges strive to 
capture its effect on civil rights in the United States. Some commentators envision qualified 
immunity as a necessary evil, while others identify the doctrine as a vice suffocating the 
protection of civil rights. Regardless of how one views qualified immunity, it can hardly be 
denied that if left unfettered, the doctrine persistently threatens the promise of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - 
that all persons have a remedy by law when public officials deprive them of rights secured by the 
Constitution and laws of this country.”).  
228 Id. at 1027–28. 
229 Id. at 1035–36. 
230 Id. at 1036. 
231 Id. at 1035–37. 
232 Id. at 1058–60. 
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plaintiffs can more likely demonstrate that the law is clearly established.233 Of course, officials 
may gain under extracircuit precedent as well if they can find conflicting case law, which would 
demonstrate the law is not settled.234 Ackerman recognizes that it might be unfair to expect 
officials to know the law throughout the country, but argues that “notions of fairness and 
practicality compete under §1983.”235 In her view, “the balance is still tilted strongly in favor of 
defendants,” and needs correction.236 
In engaging in the clearly-established-law inquiry, each circuit considers precedent 
beyond the Supreme Court, even if just its own.237 Of course, even though the circuits consider 
precedent other than the Court’s to find clearly established law, their approaches are subject to 
critique.238 It may be that most commentators are upset about qualified immunity generally, 
rather than any specific ideation of it.239 One circuit’s recent approach, however, has received 
praise.240 
The Fourth Circuit in Bellotte v. Edwards241 found a violation of clearly established law 
based on its own precedents, even though they were factually distinguishable.242 It explained that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Id. at 1055. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1055–56. 
236 Id. at 1029. 
237 Id. at 1035–37. 
238 See, e.g., Kate Seabright, Arriving at Clearly Established: The Taser Problem and Reforming 
Qualified Immunity Analysis in the Ninth Circuit, 89 WASH. L. REV. 491 (2014); Amelia A. 
Friedman, Qualified Immunity in the Fifth Circuit: Identifying the “Obvious” Hole in Clearly 
Established Law, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2012). 
239 Justice Thomas has opined that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), has been expanded far beyond its 
originally intended limited scope. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 491 (Thomas, concurring) 
(1994). Arguably, the Court is using qualified immunity as a blunt instrument to quell the beast 
and satisfy the competing policy concerns it has unraveled. Cf. Ruvosky, supra note 216, at 79–
81 (suggesting qualified immunity is not well suited to balancing § 1983 policy interests). 
240 See generally Daniel K. Siegel, Clearly Established Enough: The Fourth Circuit’s New 
Approach to Qualified Immunity in Bellotte v. Edwards, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1241 (2012). 
241 629 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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qualified immunity “protect[s] against liability [only] for ‘bad guesses in gray areas.’”243 The 
officers, who engaged in a no-knock entry of the plaintiff’s home, argued that the circumstances 
of the case were “so infrequent, so uncommon that it's a gray area,” and thus they should be 
entitled to qualified immunity.244 The Fourth Circuit returned, “The absence of ‘a prior case 
directly on all fours’ here speaks not to the unsettledness of the law, but to the brashness of the 
conduct.”245 The Fourth Circuit noted that it was faced with “an unfortunate exception to the 
truism that ‘[t]he easiest cases don't even arise,’”246 and it found a clearly established right even 
though there were no cases on point, similar to the Supreme Court in Hope.247 
Bellotte indicates two things, one direct and one indirect. First, it directly indicates that 
the Hope Court’s concept of obvious rights is still relevant. Second, it indirectly indicates that 
limiting the clearly-established inquiry to Supreme Court cases will not prevent plaintiffs from 
obtaining recovery simply because there is not a prior case directly on all fours with the case at 
bar. With this in mind, this article will now address why the Supreme Court is the only relevant 
arbiter for clearly establishing federal law, with the only possible exception being the official’s 
home circuit. 
VI. WHY ONLY THE SUPREME COURT CAN CLEARLY ESTABLISH FEDERAL LAW 
Having already surveyed the history and policies of qualified immunity, and the roles and 
limitations of the respective courts, this article contends that the Supreme Court is the only 
relevant arbiter of clearly established federal constitutional and statutory law for qualified-
immunity purposes under § 1983. To say otherwise creates an onerous burden that no reasonable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Siegel, supra note 240, at 1242–43 (citing Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 431–32 (Wynn, J., dissenting 
in part). 
243 Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 424 (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. (quoting Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
246 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). 
247 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733, 741 (2002). 
34 Kevin Stokes 
official should be expected to carry, and it does not comport with a proper balancing of the 
principles underlying qualified immunity. If officials simply must consider any other precedent, 
it is that of their home circuit—and only that circuit. 
Whether the Supreme Court should be the only relevant arbiter of federal law for 
qualified-immunity purposes, it is clear that it is the ultimate arbiter.248 It reviews federal issues 
decided by both state and federal courts, and one of its primary purposes is to settle conflicting 
interpretations of federal law among the lower courts.249 Where every other court’s decisions are 
subject to review, it raises the question of whether their decisions are anything but guesswork.  
Guesswork or not, the fact remains that circuit decisions are subject to reversal, and there 
can be splits in circuit authority. Finding such turbulent, precarious law to be the source of 
clearly established law paralyzes the official by requiring her to consider not only the Supreme 
Court, but her home circuit, neighboring circuits, and perhaps all of them. The typical official is 
not a legal scholar, and agencies have finite budgets for in-house counsel. The law that can 
reasonably be considered by the official is necessarily limited, and should be limited to Supreme 
Court precedent. 
One could argue that the Supreme Court is itself only ever involved in guesswork, 
considering the Court can and does overrule its earlier pronouncements of law.250 The Court’s 
law seems settled because of stare decisis, but the Court could overrule its prior precedent at any 
time, making it questionable and open to debate. This recalcitrance is but a scratch against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); see also Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827). 
249 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
250 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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Court’s establishment of federal law, however, and does not seriously countenance against 
reliance on the Court’s opinions as the definitive interpretation of federal law. 
One might also argue that the Court cannot be the only relevant arbiter of federal rights 
because it refuses to recognize new rights.251 But rights can be established in at least three ways. 
First, they can be established in criminal cases.252 Second, they can be established by the Court at 
its discretion.253 And third, they can be established in cases against municipalities, which do not 
have qualified immunity.254 Where the constitutional question warrants, the Court may provide 
an answer even in the absence of a circuit split.255 
In any event, the concern over the establishment of rights is mitigated by the fact that a 
right need not be clearly established by a prior precedent on all fours. Certainly, a highly 
generalized right cannot be successfully invoked in qualified-immunity claims.256 But a factually 
identical case is not required either.257 There is room to argue about the proper level of similarity 
required to find that an officer had fair warning that the conduct at issue infringed upon a 
constitutional right.258  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (rejecting the rule requiring consideration 
of the substantive constitutional merits of a qualified immunity claim). 
252 Notably, this does not protect against constitutional injuries that rarely, if ever, become an 
issue in criminal cases. 
253 The lower courts can try to force the Court’s hand by deciding the merits of the constitutional 
question, strong-arming the Court to correct any errors, or explaining the right for the Court to 
affirm. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).  
254 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Attributing the conduct of a 
government official to the municipality can be difficult, but if there is widespread abuse, a 
litigant could successfully find that the municipality acquiesced and supported a custom carrying 
the force of law. This will be returned to later. 
255 SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
256 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–40 (1987). 
257 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733, 741 (2002). 
258 See, e.g., Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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The proper focus ought to be on what a reasonable official would think the right is, not 
what a savvy lawyer might argue. This is particularly relevant given the Court’s move toward 
establishing rights in a more general way subject to balancing tests.259 It may be prudent to shift 
the focus from establishing whether an exception to the general rule existed in a narrow sense to 
establishing whether an exception to the general rule could have reasonably been expected to 
exist.260 This would realign the burden from the plaintiff (to show that the right existed) to the 
official (to show that the right reasonably did not exist given the general nature of the right). And 
while qualified immunity is meant to protect officials from the distraction of lawsuits,261 it would 
be disingenuous for officials to claim immunity when they have violated clearly established, 
arguably general, rights to which no exception can reasonably be found. If this issue is resolved 
in favor of the plaintiff, there is less of a need to consider lower-court precedent, and the official 
may reasonably consider only Supreme Court precedent without being distracted by excessive 
legal research. 
Distraction from the official’s duties is an important consideration, and plays into the 
proper level of deterrence against officials engaging in unconstitutional conduct. On one hand, 
society wants officials to be deterred from inflicting constitutional injuries. On the other hand, 
society wants officials to do their jobs effectively. Officials cannot be reasonably expected to 
survey the law of every state and federal jurisdiction while also serving the public. Even ignoring 
state and federal trial courts, there are still thirteen circuit courts and fifty states, each of which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 See Chen, supra note 221, at 44.  
260 See, e.g., id. at 50; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 619 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
261 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). 
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may have both a court of appeals and supreme court.262 The courts that a reasonable official 
should be expected to review must be limited, and should be limited to the Supreme Court. 
Too much deterrence creates a perverse result. If an official is on the hook for a 
constitutional injury as defined by a majority of the courts (but notably not his or her home 
circuit), the official could become paralyzed by fear: Could this conduct be considered 
unconstitutional in any one of the states or circuits? Now an exhaustive analysis must be 
conducted before the official performs his or her duties. Police response may be delayed to 
determine the rights of the parties involved in a 9-1-1 call, and school administration may be 
stagnated to determine the rights of unruly students. The question is exemplified by whether a 
school principal is an administrator or a legal scholar. Too much of the latter distracts officials 
from performing the functions with which they are tasked, to the detriment of the public whom 
they serve. And whether the official is actually subject to liability, the threat of suit alone is 
deterrence.263 To give the reasonable official breathing room to serve the public, only Supreme 
Court precedent should be considered relevant.  
One may argue that the delay in or denial of access to justice is a price too high for 
effective administration of government.264 This is a valid concern, but ultimately it does not 
prescribe the review of every appellate court in the land before the official acts. Even if we limit 
the official to considering the Supreme Court, the official’s home circuit, and the official’s home 
state, the official is now required to review the precedents of up to four courts. This cannot be. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 See Introduction to the Federal Court System, supra note 174; State Government, supra note 
175. 
263 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
264 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 227, at 1029 (stating the scales are tilted too far in the official’s 
favor). 
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Most state supreme courts operate in the same manner as the Supreme Court of the 
United States, settling jurisprudential questions of major significance. The same arguments that 
countenance against reliance upon only the Supreme Court265 would dictate that a state supreme 
court cannot be the only state court that officials consider. Officials must, therefore, consider the 
state court of appeals, state supreme court, circuit court of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The typical official and government agency does not have that much time or 
resources. In addition, state courts have expertise in state-law matters, and federal courts have 
expertise in federal-law matters.266 State-court precedent simply does not carry the same weight 
that federal-court precedent does for federal-law questions, and their substantive constitutional 
law should not dictate the official’s conduct.267 Even if officials must consider federal circuit 
precedents, they should not be required to consider state court precedents. 
Deterrence is as much a shield for the government as it is a sword for the plaintiff in this 
battle of policy. Officials must be given deference to fulfill their responsibilities, and should not 
be overly deterred from doing so. In a society increasingly regulated by legislatively created 
agencies and legislatively enacted statutes, officials are tasked with balancing the dictates of 
sometimes-competing laws and policies, and the rights of the individual. This is not an easy task, 
and the official will inevitably err. Where that error is reasonable in light of their task, they 
should not be held liable for the reasonable discharge of their duty. Not every constitutional 
violation has a remedy.268 The obvious violations, however, are always protected.269 Where it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 See discussion supra Part V. 
266 Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal courts defer to state 
high courts’ interpretations of their state's own law.”). 
267 State precedent can dictate the official’s conduct in other ways, however, such as finding that 
a right is clearly established in Supreme Court precedent even if the relevant Circuit has not so 
held. 
268 Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999). 
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not clear that the official’s actions are in violation of federal law, the federal courts should limit 
their involvement in the official’s affairs. 
This limited involvement, however, does not give officials carte blanche authority to 
engage in questionable constitutional conduct in infinitum. If one official engages in conduct that 
is arguably, but not clearly, unconstitutional, the official should not be held liable for infliction of 
any constitutional injury. This reflects the policy balance and deference we give to officials. But 
the tables turn when this becomes systemic. If one or more officials repeatedly engage in the 
same conduct that is arguably unconstitutional, the circuit court can declare that it is so.270 But 
what good is it if the circuit court still holds the right was not clearly established? 
Even assuming that the Court does not consider the issue on appeal,271 the official would 
be put on notice that he or she is engaging in unconstitutional conduct. More importantly, the 
municipality would be on notice that its agents are engaging in unconstitutional conduct. If the 
agency does nothing to stop the conduct, it would arguably become a custom—a practice so 
permanent and well-settled as to have the force of law of the municipality.272 If there is a custom, 
the plaintiff can sue the municipality, and skip the qualified-immunity quagmire.273 Accordingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997). 
270 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (stating courts can still declare constitutional 
rights even though they are not required to do so).  
271 It can be expected that government officials would seek to appeal a ruling that their conduct 
was unconstitutional, even if they were shielded by qualified immunity. The officials would be 
concerned about their public appearance, and would also argue that the circuit erred. 
272 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970). 
273 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (holding municipalities do not have 
qualified immunity). Admittedly, it is a long road to haul to sue a municipality for a custom and 
obtain monetary redress. But this demonstrates the unlikelihood of systemic constitutional injury, 
not the subjugation of plaintiffs to the omnipotent official. This concern presumes several things. 
First, the official engaged in unconstitutional conduct. Second, the Supreme Court has not 
already established a right. Third, the Circuit will refuse to hold that the conduct is 
unconstitutional. Fourth, the official will not be deterred by litigation. Fifth, the agency will not 
pressure the official to cease the conduct. Sixth, the legislature will not enact state law to avoid 
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there is no need to rely on lower-court precedent to overcome qualified immunity, and yet again 
the reasonable official need only consider Supreme Court precedent in the first instance of 
engaging in questionable constitutional conduct in the performance of his or her duties. 
If a court were to consider any precedent other than that of the Supreme Court, it should 
be limited to the home circuit of the official. Although the Supreme Court can resolve issues on 
appeal that are not subject to an interpretive split of authority in the circuits,274 the fact is that it 
still rejects about 99% of the appeals filed by plaintiffs.275 The Court is more likely to resolve 
issues based on either jurisprudential significance or the presence of a split of authority.  
This causes a problem if there are constitutional rights subject to infringement by 
officials that are unanimously recognized by the circuits but not the Supreme Court. Such a 
predicament could insulate the official from liability for infringing upon nationally recognized 
rights that have no reason to be clarified or reviewed by the Supreme Court. Requiring officials 
to consider their home-circuit precedent would combat this hypothetical phenomenon, at least 
where their home circuit has addressed the issue. 
Looking to the official’s home circuit also allows the federal law to develop locally to the 
benefit of plaintiffs, and without undue disruption to officials. Plaintiffs can show that a right is 
clearly established in the circuit, and officials could likely still perform their duties effectively 
and efficiently despite the additional court to review. Since circuits require the official to 
consider their precedent anyway,276 officials probably already budget the resources to do so. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
future violations. Seventh, the public will not vote out the public official or otherwise pressure 
systemic change. And eighth, the official or agency will not settle with the plaintiff, thereby 
providing compensation for the injury even if the right violated is not clearly established. 
274 SUP. CT. R. 10(c). 
275 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 184. 
276 Ackerman, supra note 227, at 1037–37. 
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Requiring review of home-circuit precedent would not tilt the scales dramatically one way or the 
other, since both sides gain from the inclusion of only home-circuit precedent.  
The scales stay in relative balance until officials are required to consider extracircuit 
precedent. It might seem that if we ask the official can look to home-circuit precedent, then we 
can ask the official to review extracircuit precedent as well. But the same considerations 
elucidated at the beginning of this section for limiting review to the Supreme Court also caution 
against requiring officials to consider extracircuit precedent. While consideration of the 
precedents of two courts might be acceptable, consideration of the Supreme Court and every 
circuit court requires too much time and too many resources for the typical official. 
It is readily apparent that consideration of extracircuit precedent will stagnate the official 
in his duties, and create uncertainty for the official and the plaintiff. From the official’s 
perspective, what if the official’s home circuit does not recognize a right, but every other circuit 
does? What if the official’s home circuit does not recognize a right, and there is a split in the 
other circuits? And from the plaintiff’s perspective, what if the official’s home circuit recognizes 
a right, but other circuits disagree, or every circuit disagrees? What if the official’s home circuit 
recognizes a right, but no other circuit has addressed the question? Uncertainty looms. 
There is no end to the iterations of the basic question of whether officials should pay 
more attention to the precedent of their own or their neighboring circuits. Finding an answer to 
the myriad of questions potentially posed is a formidable task, and would probably turn on the 
specific circumstances of each case. The real problem for officials, however, is even getting to 
the point where they can answer the question, which requires them to first determine what the 
right question to ask is. 
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In order to ask the right question, officials must first survey every other circuit to 
determine the scope of their established rights. Requiring officials to review every other circuit’s 
precedent is untenable. If officials must look to lower-court precedent at all, then their home 
circuit’s precedent should be the only inquiry. If the home circuit recognizes the right, then that 
is the end of the inquiry to the benefit of plaintiffs. If the home circuit does not recognize the 
right, then that is the end of the inquiry to the benefit of officials. This permits no additional 
iterations, and alleviates guesswork.  
Notably, these issues are not raised if the scope of relevant precedent is limited to the 
Supreme Court. It is not much of a concession to say that trial courts should be excluded from 
the analysis because the official is still confronted by the precedent of fifty states and thirteen 
circuits. And it does little to help find the line where the reasonable official’s inquiry should end. 
This article has presented the reasons for limiting the inquiry to the Supreme Court, or perhaps 
the official’s home circuit. Anything further magnifies the amount of continual research the 
official must do to an unattainable level. Unless Congress is willing to step in and conduct the 
balancing of policies,277 the proper scope of review for officials should be the Supreme Court of 
the United States, with the possible inclusion of the official’s home circuit. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The competing interests at stake in qualified immunity are varied and significant. The 
scales largely tilt in favor of requiring officials to only review Supreme Court precedent. This 
result is troubling, because it is tension with the purpose of § 1983: providing plaintiffs with a 
means of redress for constitutional injuries that might not otherwise exist. Yet, when the Court 
has held that Congress enacted § 1983 against the backdrop of immunities, which Congress has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 See discussion supra note 220. 
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not questioned, the bitter pill must be swallowed: Not every constitutional injury has a remedy. 
Government officials are protected so long as their conduct is reasonable, even if it is injurious.  
In finding that no reasonable official should be expected to know the multi-jurisdictional 
interplay of constitutional law, the conclusion must be that the official is shielded from liability 
in a way perhaps distasteful. But officials should be focused on performing their duties, not 
studying law. It may be that we expect too much from our officials, and the only way to limit 
constitutional injury is to reduce the intersection between government and private individuals. 
But this remedy will be found in the legislatures, not the courts. Similarly, if the Court’s 
qualified-immunity analysis is contrary to widely accepted policy, Congress can always correct 
the problem. Members of Congress are accountable to their constituency—the Court has none. 
